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Abstract 
This study seeks to examine the mechanisms by which a corporation’s use of philanthropy 
affects its reputation for corporate social performance (CSP), which the authors conceive of as 
consisting of two dimensions: CSP awareness and CSP perception. Using signal detection theory 
(SDT), the authors model signal amplitude (the amount contributed), dispersion (number of areas 
supported), and consistency (presence of a corporate foundation) on CSP awareness and 
perception. Overall, this study finds that characteristics of firms' portfolio of philanthropic 
activities are a greater predictor of CSP awareness than of CSP perception. Awareness increases 
with signal amplitude, dispersion, and consistency.  CSP perception is driven by awareness and 
corporate reputation. The authors’ contention that corporate philanthropy is a complex variable is 
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upheld, as we find that CSP signal characteristics influence CSP awareness and perception 
independently and asymmetrically. The authors conclude by proposing avenues for future 
research.  
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Corporate giving is becoming big business and a major strategic issue for firms as they 
increasingly position themselves as socially responsible organizations. In 2014, Walmart and its 
foundation distributed over US $1.4 billion in in-kind donations and grants around the world. 
Whether corporations can benefit from philanthropic activities has consequently received 
increasing attention from managers and researchers (Saiia, Carroll, & Buchholtz, 2003). A 2008 
Conference Board survey found that the principal management issue for most respondents was 
measurement of the outcomes of their firm’s philanthropic activities (Cavicchio & Torok, 2008).  
The sensitivity to corporate giving’s outcomes is also reported in (Maas & Liket, 2011) who 
found that between 62% and 76% of firms listed in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) 
measured the effectiveness of their philanthropic activities. In order to aid both firm managers 
and scholars in their quest to identify how corporations can benefit from philanthropic activities, 
we propose that it is essential to understand corporate philanthropy's influence on the firm’s 
reputation for social performance. 
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 Understanding corporate philanthropy’s effect on the firm’s reputation for corporate 
social performance (CSP) is important for many reasons. Studies have long contended that a 
reputation for CSP is a significant determinant of many positive organizational outcomes, such 
as overall reputation (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), organizational 
attractiveness to potential employees (Greening & Turban, 2000; Lin et al., 2012; Turban & 
Greening, 1997), favorable corporate evaluations and product impressions from consumers 
(Brown & Dacin, 1997; Lii & Lee, 2012), and partial buffering from scandal revelations (Janney 
& Gove, 2011). Moreover, in the extensive literature investigating the effect of CSP on financial 
performance (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 
2003; Roman, Hayibor, & Agle, 1999), a firm’s reputation for CSP is often seen as a mediating 
variable between CSP and financial performance.1 Of course philanthropy is one of many aspects 
of CSP (Waddock & Graves, 1997), but philanthropy is particularly important as it is 
characterized by a great degree of discretion (Hadani & Coombes, 2015). Understanding the 
effect of corporate philanthropy, which can be seen as a voluntary, non-obligatory, and non-
reciprocal transfer of wealth from the corporation to its external stakeholders (Godfrey, 2005; 
Hadani & Coombes, 2015; Seifert, Morris, & Bartkus, 2004), on the firm’s reputation for CSP is 
also critical as increasing resource scarcity is making firms increasingly strategic in their 
philanthropic donations (Liket & Maas, 2016; Saiia et al., 2003). 
In this study, we use signal detection theory (SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966; Peterson, 
Birdsall, & Fox, 1954) to examine the relationship between corporate philanthropic contributions 
and the firm’s reputation for CSP. Drawing on prior literature (Gardberg & Schepers, 2008; 
Rindova et al., 2005), we conceive reputation for CSP as consisting of two dimensions: CSP 
awareness and CSP perception. CSP awareness refers to the “collective awareness and 
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recognition” (Rindova et al., 2005) of stakeholders regarding the firm’s CSP, whereas CSP 
perception refers to the stakeholder evaluations of the firm’s CSP, their positive or negative 
evaluation of the firm’s CSP. According to SDT theory, firms send various signals about 
themselves via their corporate philanthropy. Firms’ stakeholders, who receive these signals 
under uncertain conditions, are not always able to discriminate the signal from the noise, and 
thus cannot decide whether the corporation is socially responsible or not. It is therefore important 
to distinguish between stakeholder recognition of the firm’s CSP (CSP awareness) and 
stakeholders’ appraisal of the firm’s CSP (CSP perception), because they reflect two distinct but 
still interconnected signaling processes: signal receipt and evaluation. We expect that firms 
influence stakeholders’ CSP awareness and perception via signals constructed by corporate 
philanthropy. Moreover, higher CSP awareness is expected to affect CSP perception. In this way, 
CSP awareness will partially mediate the relationship between corporate philanthropy and CSP 
perception. 
Drawing on multiple data sources, including a database of 33,562 individual evaluations 
of 60 companies collected by the Reputation Institute (RI) and Harris Interactive (HI) as part of 
their Reputation Quotient (RQ) Annual 2001 study, we analyze the effect that different aspects 
of corporate philanthropy have on the firm’s reputation for CSP. Overall, we find that 
characteristics of firms’ portfolio of philanthropic activities are important predictors of CSP 
awareness but not CSP perception.  CSP awareness increases with signal amplitude (dollars 
contributed), signal dispersion (number of areas supported), and signal consistency (presence of 
a corporate foundation).  CSP awareness mediates the relationship of the signal characteristics 
with CSP perception. In addition, respondents used corporate reputation as a substitute for CSP 
characteristics when awareness was low. Foreign firms suffer from lower awareness and lower 
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perception of their activities even after controlling for age in the US, size, and profitability.  In 
addition, our control variables demonstrate that both CSP awareness and CSP perception vary 
across sex, race, and age. 
We organize the rest of this article as follows. We briefly discuss our understanding of 
the reputation for CSP and identify its two constituent dimensions: awareness and perception. 
We then introduce signal detection theory (SDT) as a platform to link corporate philanthropy 
with reputation for CSP. Following that introduction of SDT, we describe our data and 
methodology, and provide the results of our analysis. We discuss our findings and conclude with 
implications for academics and managers as well as recommendations for further research. 
 
Reputation for Corporate Social Performance  
Following extensive work in the reputation literature (Fombrun, Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000; 
Fombrun & Riel, 1997; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2002; Rindova et al., 2005), we conceive a firm’s 
reputation for CSP as the estimation in which the firm’s various stakeholders hold its CSP. A 
firm’s reputation for CSP results from the accumulation of various positive and negative CSP 
signals, which enhance and diminish reputation, respectively (Cornelissen, Haslam, & Balmer, 
2007; Janney & Gove, 2011; Rao, 1994). It can shape overall corporate reputation, as 
stakeholders use the firm’s CSP activities as signals that allow them to evaluate the firm and its 
activities under conditions of incomplete information (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Moreover, 
reputation for CSP has been found to enhance several positive organizational outcomes such as 
attractiveness to labor markets and favorable product impressions by consumers, inter alia 
(Brammer & Millington, 2005; Brown & Dacin, 1997; Greening & Turban, 2000; Janney & 
Gove, 2011; Lii & Lee, 2012; Lin et al., 2012; Turban & Greening, 1997).  
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Overall, corporate reputation has been mainly viewed from an economics and an 
institutional perspective. These perspectives jointly propose that reputation is a bi-dimensional 
concept consisting of stakeholders’ awareness and perception. For our purposes, we draw on 
prior literature on CSP reputation (Gardberg & Schepers, 2008; Rindova et al., 2005) to propose 
that reputation for CSP consists of two dimensions: CSP awareness and CSP perception. As per 
the study of reputation from an institutional perspective (Rindova et al., 2005), CSP awareness 
refers to stakeholders’ “collective awareness and recognition” regarding the firm’s CSP. CSP 
perception refers to the stakeholder evaluations of the firm’s CSP as good or bad. As per the 
study of firm reputation from an economics perspective (Rindova et al., 2005), CSP perception 
can be seen as reducing the uncertainty caused by information asymmetries that stakeholders 
face in dealing with firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Lopatta, Buchholz, & Kaspereit, 2016). 
For example, Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) found that firms which sell credence or experience 
goods whose quality cannot be verified pre-purchase, use their CSP to signal that they are 
reliable with trustworthy products. 
Conceiving reputation for CSP as a bi-dimensional concept allows us to refine the 
understanding of signaling processes occurring at different levels. For example, stakeholders 
might be very aware of a firm’s CSP but perceive that the firm is performing very poorly. This 
combination is quite a common phenomenon when a firm becomes instantly known due to its 
involvement in a crisis, but is also blamed for it due to its CSP lapses. The BP Gulf of Mexico 
explosion is a good example. 
This approach complements prior research by adding a multi-level process. In building 
our theory, we use awareness as the level of specific knowledge of a firm’s philanthropic 
activities, and evaluation to indicate the degree to which perception of a firm is positive or 
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negative. In this approach, we draw on signaling theory that enables us to identify corporate 
philanthropy’s underlying attributes that hold signaling capacity to affect firms’ CSP awareness 
and perception. The next section offers pairs of hypotheses.  
 
Signal Detection Theory and Corporate Philanthropy 
SDT (Connelly et al., 2011; Green & Swets, 1966; Peterson et al., 1954; Swets, Tanner, & 
Birdsall, 1961; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) is an information economics theory that discusses the 
process by which corporations and other parties try to relay positive information about 
themselves under conditions of information asymmetry and uncertainty. According to these 
theories, corporate behaviors, such as philanthropy in our research setting, signal information 
about a company’s products, current CSP and policies as well as future intent to various current 
and potential stakeholders. Due to uncertainty the perceiver (in our case, the relevant 
stakeholder) is attempting to discriminate signal from noise, and determine when the signal is 
present and credible: in this case, to determine whether the corporation is a socially responsible 
corporation or not. This approach implies that the more pronounced the signal is, the greater the 
difference between the mean value of the signal and the mean value of the noise; the greater its 
breadth, its spread over different activities; and the greater the signal’s clarity, its consistency 
over time, the greater the likelihood that a signal receiver (stakeholder) will interpret it correctly 
(Swets, 1961; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). A stakeholder will correctly perceive a firm to be 
socially responsible when it actually is, or will correctly perceive a firm not to be socially 
responsible when it is indeed not responsible. In other words, the stakeholder will avoid both 
kinds of errors: perceiving the firm to be what it is not or perceiving it not to be what it is.    
Though initially focused on the perception of sensory data, SDT applications have 
broadened to include other forms of perceptual data (Martin, 1975). Ye and Van Raaij (2004) 
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examined the construction of brand equity in the mind of consumers using SDT. Robertson, 
Eliashberg, and Rymon (1995) investigated firm interactions with respect to new product signals, 
looking at hostility and signal credibility of the sending firm, and also the receiver characteristics 
of the competitor firms. It has been widely used in management, marketing, and finance 
contexts, including research studies on CSP (Lin et al., 2012; Riordan, Gatewood, & Bill, 1997; 
Robinson, Kleffner, & Bertels, 2011; Turban & Greening, 1997), labor markets (Spence, 1973), 
organizational reputation (Behrend, Baker, & Thompson, 2009), new product introduction 
(Akerlof, 1970), and price (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, and 
Derfus (2006) used SDT to investigate the relationship between market actions and the 
construction of firm reputation. Heil and Robertson (1991) used SDT to examine competitive 
market actions between firms. Germane to this research, they modeled corporate philanthropy as 
one mechanism to assert competitive advantage. Prabhu and Stewart (2001) explored how 
managers interpret competitors’ signals over time and across market contexts. They found that 
the focus and strength of the incumbent’s signals influenced entrants’ perception of 
aggressiveness. They also explored the efficacy of bluffs. Cohen and Dean (2005) explored how 
top management team composition and legitimacy signals information during an initial public 
offering. Zhang and Wiersema (2009) examined how CEO background signaled credibility 
during CEOs’ certification of corporate financial statements. Lin et al. (2012) found that firms’ 
corporate citizenship attracted job seekers. In summary, SDT explains how organizations and 
stakeholders manage the asymmetric information and the uncertainty that underlies much of 
strategic decision-making.   
We propose that SDT provides a strong theoretical background for understanding 
corporate philanthropy, offering insights into firm-consumer signaling and inter-firm (or 
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competitive) signaling. Corporate philanthropy, which Carroll (2004) places at the top of his 
CSR pyramid to illustrate its discretionary nature, is one means by which firms stake out 
competitive advantage over other firms (Basdeo et al., 2006; Heil & Robertson, 1991; Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988), signal that the firm stands out from its competition (Werner, 2011) and 
influence the institutional impression of the firm (Godfrey, 2005). In particular, SDT enables us 
to gauge the signaling power of corporate philanthropy and its likely impact on firms’ reputation 
for CSP.  
We distinguish three signal elements that allow a firm to better position itself amongst its 
stakeholders, via its philanthropy. One element is the amplitude of the signal, for example, the 
amount of money given by the firm to charity. Signal amplitude is analogous to the volume of a 
sound; a stronger amplitude signal is more likely to be distinguished from the background noise. 
The second element is signal dispersion. Signal dispersion’s effect varies in the same way as a 
floodlight sheds light over a large area but with low intensity per area, versus the dispersion 
effects of a spotlight or the focused beam of a laser. The greater the dispersion of the signal, in 
this case the spread of the firm’s philanthropic activities in many areas, the greater the chance 
that a cause dear to a particular stakeholder will be included; but for a given level of donations 
this spread also means that the less noticeable will be the effect to a particular cause. The third 
signal element is signal consistency. Consistency in this particular case means that the signal is 
consistent and unambiguous about what it means in spite of the background noise around it. In 
our particular case, we take the presence of a corporate foundation as an indicator that the firm 
intends to consistently contribute to its philanthropic causes. We assert that each of these three 
signal elements plays an important role in how stakeholders understand what a firm signals 
through its philanthropy and therefore all three should impact the firm’s reputation for CSP.  
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As noted earlier, SDT is grounded on the premise that signals direct the attention of firm 
stakeholders under information asymmetry and uncertainty conditions. However, in order for a 
signal to relieve uncertainty, it needs to be not only strong (amplitude) but also clear and 
unambiguous. While a firm’s overall size of donations, or the signal amplitude, may indicate 
commitment to CSP, stakeholders may interpret the signal inaccurately for several reasons, 
including transmission noise or appropriateness (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). In terms of 
individual awareness, corporations that send volatile signals (of varying frequency and/or 
amplitude) will have a greater chance to be discounted or disregarded by individuals, as the 
signal is likely be interpreted as noise.  However, corporations that send consistent signals will 
have a clearer signal, and individuals will have a greater likelihood of attentiveness to such 
signals.  
We develop our theory first by considering an example of effective corporate 
philanthropy. One of the most ubiquitous charities from one of the most ubiquitous firms, 
McDonald’s Ronald McDonald House, is a charity serving families whose children are 
hospitalized with cancer (narrow signal dispersion). McDonald’s targets the family market with 
its “Happy Meals” and playgrounds at many of its restaurants, serving at lower prices relative to 
competitors. In this case, price does not necessarily convey high quality (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1986). Yet, McDonald’s has established a niche philanthropy, which strongly identifies it with its 
target market. And by establishing a philanthropic market leader position, McDonald’s has 
effectively warded off all challenges to this space.2 
Whereas consumers might see this philanthropy as a friendly gesture, the philanthropy is 
very potent in terms of its competitors. McDonald’s has proactively established its footprint via 
dominant levels of contribution and marketing in this space (signal amplitude), and no new 
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entrants are able to gain footing. Though such signaling does not threaten the immediate future 
of other competitors in terms of their overall product (Heil & Robertson, 1991), it does serve as a 
barrier to entry for them to move into this philanthropic branding space. Further, McDonald’s 
has been very consistent in branding this presence, and has contributed successively over the 
years to continue its presence (signal consistency). Such consistency renders the signal 
McDonald’s sends to customers and competitors as highly credible. (Robertson et al., 1995) 
identified these two signal characteristics (hostility and credibility) as important in new product 
announcements, and we consider them equally important here in terms of defending the 
philanthropic space. Had McDonald’s not been assertive or consistent in terms of establishing its 
philanthropic space, others might have considered entering this market. As it is, no challenges 
have been made due to these attributes, and McDonald’s has a very strong branding presence 
with its charity.   
The cosmetics industry and its cause-related marketing efforts with breast cancer 
philanthropies is analogous, though more than one cosmetics firm has used such cause-related 
marketing efforts. In these instances, no single firm has adopted an overly-aggressive stance that 
would preclude others from entering the marketing space, in an instance of what (Nalebuff & 
Brandenburger, 1997) might consider as co-opetition. In this case, all firms are made better off 
by no single firm claiming the space as its own, though this type of behavior does also open the 
door to industry free riders. 
 
Signal Amplitude 
Signal amplitude refers to the magnitude or strength of a signal, which is analogous to the 
volume of a sound. With stronger amplitude, a signal is more likely to be distinguished from the 
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background noise. By extension, the greater a firm's philanthropic contribution, the greater its 
influence on the firm’s reputation for CSP.  
Greater philanthropic contributions increase the signal strength to receivers and thereby 
increase CSP awareness. Philanthropic signals can only be effective if the public receives and is 
aware of them. A primary tenet of the attention literature is that actions of organizational 
stakeholders depend on their attention focus (Ocasio, 1997). The concept of relative attention 
contends that there is competition for attention (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), in our case, 
between firms. Accordingly, firms whose message is stronger are more likely to receive 
attention. Following this logic, we propose that the amount of company philanthropic donations 
will increase what individuals know about a firm’s activities. Thus, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Signal amplitude will be positively associated with a firm’s CSP awareness. 
 
As we note earlier, the majority of scholars have proposed a positive relationship between 
the amount of philanthropic contributions and corporate financial performance or other positive 
stakeholder outcomes. For example, Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan (2010, p. 182) found that 
“charitable contributions are significantly associated with future revenue, whereas the 
association between revenue and future contributions is marginally significant.” Based on their 
findings, they argue that consumer perception plays an important role in charitable contributions' 
influence on future sales. These findings contribute to the extant literature, which has identified 
firm’s reputation for CSP as a mediating variable between its various forms of CSP and financial 
performance (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Roman et 
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al., 1999; Ullmann, 1985). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that signal amplitude will 
enhance CSP perception. Thus, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Signal amplitude will be positively associated with a firm’s CSP perception. 
 
Signal Dispersion 
A firm’s dispersion, or breadth, of philanthropic activity is our second attribute of interest. Firms 
can manipulate dispersion by varying the number of causes to which they contribute. In other 
words, the content breadth of a firm’s philanthropic behavior, signal dispersion can be defined as 
number of charitable arenas to which the firm contributes, such as education, medical, or 
housing. The [Taft] Directory of Corporate Giving separates causes into ten categories. A firm 
could choose to focus its contributions on a single category such as education, or use a multi-
targeted approach to address the needs of a more diverse group of stakeholders. Since firms 
rarely contribute to a single cause, most have a portfolio of citizenship or philanthropic activities 
(Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). Thus, the content of this portfolio, rather than or in addition to the 
amount contributed, may shape awareness and perception by altering signal detection. Our 
premise is that, for any given year, firms or their foundations have a fixed amount of monies to 
distribute. Firms that opt for the multi-targeted approach may vary both the number of charitable 
categories and the number of grants, giving more dollars to fewer categories or charities, or 
fewer dollars to more categories or charities. In other words, given fixed amounts of monies, 
firms face a trade-off between their signal amplitude per category and their signal dispersion.  
 Yet, some firms’ philanthropy budget may not be a fixed amount of money.  These firms 
would have the opportunity to select categories, and then allocate budgets accordingly. In this 
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instance, the firms avoid a trade-off and the relationship between signal amplitude and signal 
dispersion would be positive.  
Firms using the multi-targeted approach will be concerned with affecting an optimal 
number of relevant stakeholder groups. Firms may even be more strategic. For example, both 
Boeing and Intel give to science education specifically. The number of causes to which a firm 
donates will influence awareness of firm CSP through the diversity of stakeholder groups 
affected. Different stakeholders will not be aware of or pay attention to all the philanthropic 
activities of the firm. Stakeholders will tend to pay more attention to categories that are 
important/closer to them and less attention to categories that are less important/further away 
from them. A firm that donates only to education, for example, will primarily affect and be 
recognized by families with children, whereas another firm that donates to both education and 
hospitals would be recognized by families with children and also families with members needing 
hospitalization, such as elderly relatives. Hence, the second firm would potentially create a 
greater awareness of its CSP in the community than the first. Basdeo et al. (2006) found that the 
greater the number of corporate strategic actions, the more effective the signaling. Thus we 
propose: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Signal dispersion will be positively associated with a firm’s CSP awareness, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
On the other hand, given that firms have a fixed amount of monies from which they make 
their donations, increasing the number of categories (signal dispersion) of donations will reduce 
the amount of contributions for a given charitable category. Therefore, we expect that the greater 
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the dispersion of a firm’s charitable donations, the less the signal amplitude per category that a 
firm will be transmitting. Further, we expect that the relationship between signal dispersion on 
CSP perception will be positive but decreasing, for the following reasons. As we mentioned 
earlier, given that firms face a trade-off between their signal amplitude per philanthropic 
category and their signal dispersion, we expect that the more stakeholders a firm reaches, the less 
impact it will have on them. Recall that stakeholders will most likely not be aware of the overall 
CSP of the firm, but only the CSP activities of the philanthropic categories that matter for them 
the most. Thus we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Signal dispersion will have a positive and decreasing relationship with a 
firm’s CSP perception, ceteris paribus. 
 
Signal Consistency 
The third consideration is signal consistency. In order for a signal to relieve uncertainty, it must 
be consistent and unambiguous. While a firm’s overall size of donations, or the signal amplitude, 
may indicate commitment to CSP, the firm’s stakeholders may interpret a signal inaccurately for 
several reasons including transmission noise or appropriateness (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). In 
terms of individual awareness, corporations that send volatile signals (such as inconsistent 
signals) have a greater chance to be discounted or disregarded by individuals, as the signal may 
likely be interpreted as noise.  However, corporations that send consistent signals will have a 
clearer signal, and individuals will have a greater likelihood of attentiveness to such signals.  
For society to be aware of a firm as a socially responsible corporation, the firm must 
consider strategic reputation building. Signal perception is hindered when the signal varies over 
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time, making it difficult for receivers to discriminate between signal and noise. In the case of 
philanthropy, a game-theoretic approach to such reputation building indicates that the firm would 
need to establish a reputation as a “giving” firm by signaling the willingness to give (Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988). A firm that gives a great deal one year and, ceteris paribus, gives little or 
nothing the next, will not establish reputational consistency. Consistent contributions provide 
clarity and enhance readability by reducing transmission noise. Thus, one motive for 
corporations to create foundations is to buffer social performance initiatives from annual 
financial performance and to provide consistent funding for their philanthropic initiatives.  
Firms also vary in their commitment to corporate philanthropy. Companies establish and 
endow charitable foundations to buffer contributions from annual financial performance, to allow 
autonomy to pursue activities that may not correspond with those of the firm and/or to shelter the 
firm itself from business cycle fluctuations (Brown, Helland, & Smith, 2006; Petrovits, 2006). 
For instance, some firms, such as American Airlines, funnel contributions through their 
corporate foundations. Others, such as Home Depot, prefer to make direct contributions. A third 
group performs both.  Brown et al. (2006) found no difference between firms with foundations 
and those without in terms of total giving, giving per employee, giving per dollar assets or giving 
per dollar sales. However, those with foundations have larger boards, lower debt ratios, lower 
institutional holdings and lower block holdings than those without.   
In summary, the function of the signal in SDT is to reduce uncertainty on the part of the 
receiver (Swets et al., 1961; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). For those who are attentive to corporate 
philanthropic endeavors, we theorize that uncertainty would be heightened to the extent that 
corporations are volatile in their contributions. Such volatility could be noted through donation 
intermittence or amount of corporate contribution. On the other hand, corporations that are 
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consistent in their contribution level over time will send clear signals to their constituents 
regarding their philanthropic position. Thus, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Signal consistency will be positively associated with a firm’s CSP awareness. 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Signal consistency will be positively associated with a firm’s CSP 
perception. 
 
Partial Mediation  
Finally, we hypothesize that CSP awareness of social performance will directly affect CSP 
perception, thereby partially mediating the relationship between the signal amplitude, dispersion 
and consistency of company philanthropic donations and CSP perception. In order for 
stakeholders to evaluate social responsibility signals, they must detect these signals. Moreover, 
as Janney and Gove (2011) argue, unknown firms, which have not emitted sufficient signals for 
stakeholders to observe and therefore evaluate them, are assumed to be of low quality. However, 
the relationship between CSP awareness and CSP perception may not be perfectly correlated 
because awareness of social responsibility can lead to both positive and negative CSP perception, 
depending on the appropriateness of the activities. Greater awareness of inappropriate activities 
will hurt perception. Specifically, 
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): CSP awareness will be positively associated with CSP perception. 
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Hypothesis 8 (H8): CSP awareness will partially mediate the effects of signal amplitude, 
dispersion, and consistency on CSP perception. 
 
Methodology and Data 
We used a database of 33,562 individual evaluations of 60 firms collected by the Reputation 
Institute (RI) and Harris Interactive (HI) as part of their Reputation Quotient (RQ) Annual 2001 
study. Prior scholars have used the publicly available RQ scores for corporate reputation 
(Kiousis, Popescu, & Mitrook, 2007). Although the US online population is approaching parity 
with the general population, some groups are underrepresented online (such as people over the 
age of 65). Thus, the data were propensity weighted to be representative of the US adult 
population. The Wall Street Journal reported additional results on January 16, 2002 (Alsop, 
2002). Individual-level data, such as CSP awareness and CSP perception as well as self-reported 
demographic data, were drawn from this database. 
We collected firm-level variables from various secondary sources such as the (formerly 
Taft) Directory of Corporate Giving (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Hadani & Coombes, 2015; Lev 
et al., 2010; Saiia et al., 2003; Seifert et al., 2004), Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990s for 
foundation tax filings (Hadani & Coombes, 2015), the Foundation Directory, and Compustat. 
We collected secondary data for 2000, the year prior to the RQ study, to better ascertain 
causality. 
 
Measures  
Dependent variables: CSP awareness and CSP perception. For CSP perception, we 
used the Social Responsibility dimension of the RQ as our dependent variable (Fombrun, 
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Gardberg, & Sever, 2000). The three items were: This company supports good causes; this 
company is an environmentally friendly company; and this company behaves responsibly 
towards the people in the communities in which operates. Each item is rated with a 7-point 
Likert-scale. The three items loaded on one factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91 and factor 
loadings of 0.90, 0.93 and 0.93, respectively explaining 84% of variance.3 We calculated the 
latent variable CSP perception by weighting the three variables by their respective factor 
loadings.  
 CSP awareness (H7) was operationalized as the response to the following item: “How 
much do you feel you know about [firm name] when it comes to its…Social Responsibility?” 
using a 3-point scale, with 1 = A Lot, 2 = Some, and 3 = Little/Nothing. We reverse coded the 
responses to facilitate interpretation.  
Independent variables. Signal amplitude (H1/2) was operationalized as the log of the 
total amount of money a firm donated to philanthropic activities (Brammer & Millington, 2005; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997). If information was missing from the Directory of Corporate Giving, 
we searched for corporate foundation 990 tax forms. If information was missing from these 
sources, we treated the amount as $0, to be consistent with SDT.  
Signal dispersion (H3/4) was operationalized as the number of causes a firm supported 
based on the number of categories from the Directory of Corporate Giving to which a firm 
donated. This directory lists ten categories: Arts & Humanities, Civic & Public Affairs, 
Education, Environment, Health, International, Religion, Science, Social Services and Other. We 
used only eight of the categories because the coding of International and Other appeared to be 
inconsistent. We took the square of signal dispersion to test H4. 
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Signal Consistency (H5/6) was operationalized as a dichotomous variable, 1 if the firm 
had a corporate foundation; otherwise 0 (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
Control variables. We include both firm-level and individual-level control variables. 
Consistent with prior research on social performance, we control for firm size with the log of net 
sales, profitability with ROA and industry with 2-digit SIC codes using 2000 data from 
Compustat (Hadani & Coombes, 2015; Seifert et al., 2004). We also control for foreignness 
because scholars have suggested that foreign firms would be at a disadvantage compared to local 
firms in choosing appropriate social performance activities (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). We 
obtained the location of corporate headquarters from Compustat to construct foreign, where 1 
equals foreign; and otherwise 0 (Zaheer, 1995). Due to its mutual status, we were unable to find 
comparable financial data for State Farm Insurance and eliminated it from our sample. Company 
age in the US was drawn from corporate websites and the Gale Group’s Business and Company 
Resource Guide. We also control for a firm’s overall corporate reputation as it appears to 
condition perception of corporate giving (Bae & Cameron, 2006; Lii & Lee, 2012) using an item 
from the survey. Since signal interpretation can vary across contexts and individuals (Prabhu & 
Stewart, 2001), we control for respondent sex, race, and age at the individual level using self-
reported data. Missing demographic data reduced our sample to 27,166 individual evaluations of 
59 firms. 
 
Analysis  
We tested hypotheses predicting CSP awareness (H1, H3, and H5) using an ordered logit model 
because the item is a limited dependent variable. We used a negative log-log setting for the logit 
model because the distribution of responses revealed a greater likelihood of low awareness of 
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social responsibility. We tested hypotheses predicting CSP perception (H2, H4, H6, and H7) 
using ordinary least squares (OLS). All models were estimated using SPSS version 23. 
 
Results 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for our study variables. The largest and 
smallest firms in our sample are Exxon-Mobil and Yahoo!, respectively. The most profitable and 
least profitable are Intel and Amazon.com, respectively. Of the sample firms, 83% had 
foundations.  
The mean level of CSP awareness was low, but the standard deviation indicates that a 
good number of respondents did have high awareness of corporate philanthropy. More than half 
the sample responded that they knew “a little” about the firm’s social responsibility. The eight 
foreign firms in our sample are headquartered in Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK. 
All have assets, employees, and distribution in the US. 
CSP perception is highly correlated with corporate reputation; however, CSP awareness 
is not correlated with corporate reputation. Signal amplitude is highly correlated with both signal 
dispersion and signal consistency. Firms with foundations tend to contribute more money overall 
to more causes. Surprisingly, signal amplitude is negative and weakly correlated with corporate 
reputation. In addition, large, older and more profitable firms tend to contribute more money. 
Due to our large sample size, many variables appear statistically significantly correlated even 
though with very low coefficients. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
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Although some correlations in Table 1 are quite high, most of our estimated variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) were well within tolerances. The highest VIF score was 4.86 for one of 
the industry dummy variables, which score was within the threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 1998) 
suggesting that our model estimates do not suffer from multicollinearity. Table 2 contains the 
results of our ordered logit analysis. Model 1 contains our control variables for predicting CSP 
awareness. Model 2 adds the direct effects, testing Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 that improve the 
explanatory power of the model observed in an increase in the chi statistic2. We also converted 
the estimates (logits) of Model 2 to odds ratios to facilitate interpretation. The odds ratio 
measures effect size based upon the ratio of the odds of one event versus another occurring. An 
odds ratio of 1 denotes that the probabilities of two events happening are each 50%. An odds 
ratio greater than 1 denotes the degree to which social responsibility awareness is more probable 
than lower awareness. An odds ratio less than 1 denotes the degree to which low awareness is 
more likely than high awareness.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Model 1 tests our control variables. Size and profitability were positively and 
significantly (p < 0.001) related to CSP awareness. However, foreignness is negatively and 
marginally significantly (p < 0.10) related to CSP awareness. Age has a neutral effect on CSP 
awareness. Model 2 tests Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. Counter to our expectations, greater 
investments in philanthropy were negatively associated with CSP awareness, thus rejecting H1. 
Broad content dispersion was positively associated with CSP awareness (p < 0.001), as predicted 
(H3). Signal consistency was positively associated with CSP awareness (p < 0.001) supporting 
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H5. The control variables remain statistically significant, whilst corporate reputation’s positive 
relationship with CSP awareness gains statistical significance.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents the OLS analysis predicting CSP perception. Model 3 includes only the 
control variables. The effects of corporate reputation and profitability are positive and 
statistically significant (p < 0.001) and the effect of foreignness is negative and statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). In Model 4 we add the three independent variables to test Hypotheses 2, 4, 
and 6. The effects of the control variables are robust across models. H2 proposes that greater 
signal amplitude leads to greater CSP perception. Counter to expectations, the coefficient of 
signal amplitude is negative. H4 proposes that greater signal dispersion increases CSP perception 
at a decreasing rate. Contrary to H4, we find that signal dispersion is positively associated with 
CSP perception (p < 0.01) and the squared term is not statistically significant in Model 5. H6 
proposes that greater signal consistency enhances CSP perception. Counter to our expectations, 
signal consistency is not related to perception of CSP.  
In Model 6 we add the hypothesized mediating variable, CSP awareness, to the analysis. 
Consistent with H7, we find that CSP awareness is positively and statistically associated with 
CSP perception (p < 0.001). Moreover, signal amplitude and dispersion lose statistical 
significance. Conversely, the model estimates for consistency reject H6. Notably, the addition of 
the main independent variables increases the explanatory power of our models as seen in 
increases in adjusted R2. 
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We utilize information from three models (2, 4, and 5) to test for the mediating role of 
awareness of CSP in the relationships of signal amplitude, dispersion and consistency with 
perception of CSP (H8). According to Baron and Kenny (1986), certain conditions apply for the 
presence of a mediating effect. First, the effects of the signal characteristics in Model 2 and 
Model 4 must be statistically significant. Second, in Model 6, the effect of awareness of CSP 
must be statistically significant and the absolute values of the effects of the signal characteristics 
must be smaller than the ones in Model 4. These conditions apply only in the case of signal 
amplitude and dispersion lending partial support to H8. In other words, awareness of CSP 
partially mediates the effect of signal dispersion on perception of CSP.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The complex interaction between the signal characteristics may confound their distinct 
relationships with awareness and perception of CSP. For example, the funds a firm donates to 
philanthropic activities may determine the spectrum of activities – beyond average monies per 
activity – and duration and repetition of philanthropic engagement. These concerns led us to 
examine the sensitivity of our initial results by also testing the individual relationships of the 
independent variables with CSP awareness and CSP perception. The new results appear in Table 
4 and Table 5.  
Table 4 pertains to the individual relationships of signal characteristics with CSP 
awareness. All three signal characteristics are positive and statistically significantly related to 
CSP awareness. With regard to the individual relationships of signal characteristics with CSP 
perception (Table 5) the new estimations suggest that all individual signal characteristics and 
awareness of CSP are conducive to CSP perception (coefficients are positive and statistically 
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significant at conventional levels). These findings are in congruence with H2, H6 and H7, 
according to which signal amplitude, signal consistency and awareness of CSP are positively 
associated with CSP perception, respectively and in conflict with H4, which proposed that signal 
dispersion affects CSP perception in a decreasingly positive fashion. In Model 12 signal 
dispersion remains positively associated with CSP perception when signal dispersion-squared is 
entered into the equation.  However, signal dispersion-squared is negative but not statistically 
significant Moreover, the control variables are qualitatively similar to the initial analysis, 
supporting our intuition about the possible implications that the underlying interactions between 
signal characteristics may have on our results.  
Similar to the main analysis, we utilize information from multiple models to examine the 
mediation effects. With regard to the individual partial mediation, we find support for all 
hypotheses. For signal amplitude, signal dispersion and signal consistency the coefficient 
declines and level of statistical significance declines when CSP awareness is entered into the 
regression. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Lastly, we ran several analyses to check for the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
operationalizations of our measures. For example, we calculated CSP perception as the mean of 
responses on the three items and re-ran the analysis. Given the similar factor loadings across the 
three items, it was not surprising that the results were consistent. We substituted foundation 
contributions for total contributions with similar results. We substituted the number of grants the 
foundation distributed for the number of funding areas, with similar results. We also ran analyses 
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omitting Wal-Mart, which served as an outlier, distributing over US $82 million through over 
70,000 grants in 2001; overall, results were robust. We are confident that CSP awareness and 
CSP perception are distinct but related components of CSP reputation. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Using signaling theory, we tested a model to examine the effect of philanthropic donations on 
reputation for CSP. In this section we summarize our results and our contributions to the 
signaling theory and signal detection literature as well as the CSP literature.  
 Overall we find support for the supposition that CSP reputation is composed of two 
distinct but related dimensions – CSP awareness and CSP perception. In addition, we find that 
signal amplitude (signal strength based on the amount of contributions) does not adequately 
explain CSP awareness. Rather, signal dispersion (number of philanthropic areas) and signal 
consistency (presence of a corporate foundation) were critical determinants of CSP awareness.   
 We also observe that the determinants of CSP awareness and CSP perception differ.  In 
contrast to CSP awareness, signal amplitude, signal dispersion and signal consistency 
individually contribute little to explain CSP perception. In fact, CSP awareness and corporate 
reputation are the strongest predictors of CSP perception.  
For firms, the funds allocated to philanthropy can be quite large. Thus, we need to 
address the economic significance as well as statistical significance of our analysis. It is difficult 
to define economic consequences when predicting a Likert-type scale.  However, we have 
compelling evidence that despite the fact that firms are spending millions on CSP, the US public 
is fundamentally ill-informed about these activities.  We first discuss CSP awareness using the 
odds ratios reported in Table 4. A firm that has donated an average annual contribution of US 
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$44.6M can increase its CSP awareness by 0.23 points on a 3-point scale with a US $1 million 
increase in amplitude, ceteris paribus. A firm that has contributed to four areas can increase its 
CSP awareness by 0.24 points by increasing its dispersion by one area. Firms with corporate 
foundations had 1.48 the CSP awareness of firms without foundations.  
CSP perception was measured with a continuous variable, so the results in Table 5 are 
easier to interpret than those of CSP awareness. We calculate the marginal effect of an increase 
in a signal characteristic for the firms’ mean level using the unstandardized coefficients. When a 
firm contributes an additional $1 million it can increase its CSP perception by 0.05 points on a 7-
point scale, ceteris paribus. A firm that increases its dispersion to an extra area increases its CSP 
perception by 0.02. Firms with corporate foundations had 0.05 points higher CSP perception than 
firms without foundations. A 1-point increase in awareness increases CSP perception by 0.28 
points.  A 1-point increase in corporate reputation increases CSP perception by 0.59 points. 
When we revisit these data, we observe that over half the sample reported knowing little 
or nothing about a company’s CSP even when they were familiar with the company. In addition, 
almost 20% of the sample responded “not sure” to all three variables used to construct CSP 
perception. Our results suggest that stakeholders rely on overall corporate reputation to evaluate 
CSP when their awareness is low. This finding is consistent with extant research that shows a 
conditioning effect of corporate reputation on CSP evaluations.  In sum, large investments in 
corporate philanthropy can only pay off if they are consistent over time, reach a variety of 
stakeholders, and the firm has a good reputation. 
 We refine the signaling literatures by identifying three features of signals -- amplitude, 
dispersion and consistency -- that resonate with conceptualizations of sound and light signals. 
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These signal features can be applied to other strategic actions. In addition, we hope that we 
inspire other scholars to consider signal features from the physical sciences. 
 Via this theoretical contribution to signaling research, we make three main contributions 
to the philanthropy literature. First, within the “strategic philanthropy” literature (Gautier & 
Pache, 2015; Liket & Maas, 2016; Porter & Kramer, 2002; Saiia et al., 2003; Wang & Qian, 
2011) our research reveals causal mechanisms that link philanthropy to the firm’s reputation for 
CSP and, subsequently, financial performance. Consistency and corporate reputation, itself, are 
clearly elements of stakeholder influence capacity (Barnett, 2007).  Second, while extensive 
scholarship has investigated corporate philanthropy’s effect on different stakeholders (Barone, 
Norman, & Miyazaki, 2007; Luo, 2005; Wang & Qian, 2011), there is very little research that 
explores the signaling aspect of philanthropy, a research gap we partially rectified by 
investigating the effect that three distinct components of philanthropic signals (amplitude, 
dispersion and consistency) have on the overall CSP reputation of the firm. Third, by 
distinguishing among these three distinct signal components of philanthropy, we contribute to an 
existing gap in the literature that does not clearly identify an array of possible philanthropic 
strategies (Frumkin, 2010; Gautier & Pache, 2015) and conceptualizations of corporate 
philanthropy and CSP as portfolios of activities (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006).  
Our results suggest that the relationships of corporate philanthropy and CSP awareness 
with CSP perception are more complex than indicated by most academic studies. Consistent with 
Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) reputation for CSP is better formulated as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon consisting of amplitude (financial commitment), dispersion (causes), and 
consistency (formal structures and routines). Regarding CSP awareness, our findings indicate 
that, in addition to the size of the firm’s donations, its dispersion in many charitable activities 
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and consequently many stakeholder groups, with corresponding interests for those activities, 
does matter. In short, we find that by increasing the breadth of their charitable donations, firms 
can reach a greater number of stakeholder groups and therefore achieve greater levels of CSP 
awareness. Moreover, our finding that the existence of a corporate foundation has a positive 
impact on CSP awareness indicates that stakeholders become more aware of firms which show 
consistency in their charitable donations through having a foundation. Firms can give money to 
their foundations in years when organizational slack allows them to be more generous 
(Buchholtz, Amason, & Rutherford, 1999) and refrain from giving money to their foundations in 
more lean years, whereas their foundation maintains a consistent, yearly presence in various 
charitable activities in all years (Seifert et al., 2004). Generally, this interpretation of our findings 
regarding signal consistency agrees with the notion of “time compression diseconomies,” 
introduced by (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), who argued that firms cannot develop certain intangible 
resources by spending large sums of money in short periods of time, but by being consistent in 
their spending over the years. 
Concerning our findings regarding CSP perception, there a few points to be made. First, 
as expected and in accordance with other empirical results in the literature (Lev et al., 2010) we 
found that signal amplitude, signal dispersion, and signal consistency are positively associated 
with CSP perception; however, once we account for CSP awareness, their direct effect on 
perception declines. Further, the conditioning effect of corporate reputation (Bae & Cameron, 
2006; Lii & Lee, 2012) stems from an overall lack of awareness about firms’ CSP.   
We believe that our research more closely resembles the ways in which managers and 
their agents, such as public relations (PR) firms, design and implement CSP rather than the ways 
in which academics perform research. From conversations with practitioners, we have a sense 
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that they tend to identify the trade-offs between the number of areas targeted versus the amount 
per area.  However, consistency in targeting areas may not be as salient. Our findings can help 
practitioners develop a portfolio of activities (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) that reduces noise 
and enhances credibility and authenticity. 
 
Limitations and Further Research 
While we are pleased with our extension of previous work, we recognize some limitations to this 
study. In contrast to (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), we do not control for research and 
development (R&D).  In our sample, many firms had R&D expenses and advertising expenses 
that did not reach the level reported in Compustat. However, corporate reputation should capture 
the secondary effects of these expenses. An additional limitation is the threat of common method 
variance from the use of questionnaire-based measures.  However, several elements of our 
research design reduce this possibility.  First, the three independent variables and firm-level 
control variables were collected from several different archival data sources. Second, although 
the hypothesized mediating variable and dependent variables originated from the same 
questionnaire administration, these two variables were separated from each other in the 
questionnaire, minimizing causal connections by respondents completing the items (Chang, van 
Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010).  Third, the individual-level control variables are fact-based 
demographic characteristics (such as gender and sex), which also reduces the possibility that 
questionnaire administration affected responses (Chang et al., 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Fourth, a factor analysis of the questionnaire items satisfied Harman’s one factor test, as a single 
factor did not emerge from the factor analysis and one general factor did not account for the 
majority of the covariance among the variables (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
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Endogeneity is a possible limitation for most model testing. We included corporate 
reputation as a control variable to capture omitted variables from the regressions models that 
could be correlated with any of the independent variables and in the special case of a relationship 
of simultaneous determination between the dependent variable and any of the independent 
variables (simultaneity). Driven by pertinent theory, we do not consider any of our independent 
variables to be co-determined with the dependent variables. In particular, our main independent 
variables represent firm-level behavior, whereas the dependent variables represent individual 
subjects’ responses. Additionally, driven by both theory as well as prior empirical work, we have 
expended extra effort to include in the models all pertinent controls related to the survey subjects 
and sample firms to alleviate the potential that omitted variables could give rise to endogeneity. 
An additional potential limitation is the age of our dataset, which the RI and HI collected 
in 2001. However, recent independent research by these organizations reinforces the role of CSP. 
For example, in its 2015 Media Release Report for the RQ (p. 4), HI (now part of Nielsen) states 
“Of all reputation dimensions, Social Responsibility remains a high bar, with only five 
companies achieving excellent rankings on this dimension and 24 companies rated Poor or Very 
Poor. Companies continue to struggle to be viewed as a good member of the community.” Given 
the currency of the issue and the richness of the individual-level dataset, we believe the insight 
into the reputation process remains a useful contribution. 
While supporting the notion that corporate philanthropy research has been 
oversimplified, our research opens several opportunities for future research, such as more 
qualitative analysis of corporate activities and the use of additional statistical techniques, such as 
hierarchical linear modeling, to tease out these relationships. Rather than count the number of 
causes, we could use the percentage of foundation funds focused on each cause. It would also be 
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interesting to examine the relationships of the causes to each firm’s line of businesses, as well as 
within different institutional environments (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006).  
In conclusion, we hypothesized and found that the characteristics of corporate 
philanthropy affect perception of social performance.  We find that research on corporate 
citizenship activities and their consequences requires a more fine-grained conceptualization of 
activities. Using expenditures alone is not an adequate conceptualization of the activities. In our 
theoretical development, we distinguish three elements of signal strength.  Signal amplitude, 
signal dispersion and signal consistency operate together to shape CSP awareness and CSP 
perception.  We assert that each plays an important role in understanding the relationships among 
actual CSP and reputation for CSP. 
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Notes 
1. Of course, as Dennis et al. (2009) discuss, there is a long-standing debate between those who 
see corporate philanthropy as strategic (Sánchez, 2000; Siegel & Vitaliano, 2007) and those who 
see it as altruistic (Shaw & Post, 1993). However, for our purposes here, this debate is not 
immediately relevant, as we examine the consequences of corporate philanthropy and not its 
motives.   
2. One US college sorority, Alpha Delta Pi, adopted the Ronald McDonald House as its national 
philanthropy in 1979. 
3. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency or reliability of items in an index. 
Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 0 to 1. A Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.70 suggests that the 
items in the index are measuring the same construct. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (n = 27,166). 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CSP perception 4.38 1.40          
2 CSP awareness 1.60 .66 .13**         
3 Signal amplitudea 6.10 2.62 -.02** .05**        
4 Signal dispersion 4.00 2.40 -.04** .07** .69**       
5 Signal consistency .83 .37 -.04** .07** .76** .66**      
6 Corporate reputation 5.56 1.42 .61** .00 -.04** -.06** -.06**     
7 Sizea 4.52 .46 -.04** .04** .49** .30** .35** -.06**    
8 Profitability .06 .10 .04** .03** .37** .26** .27** .03** .18**   
9 Foreign .08 .28 -.09** -.02** .07** .17** .14** -.09** .21** -.06**  
10 Firm age 78.77 43.57 -.01* .03** .21** .17** .30** -.02** .23** .17** -.15** 
* p < 0.05 and ** p < 0.01, (two-tailed tests). 
a Logarithmic transformation. 
CSP = Corporate social performance. 
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Table 2. Ordered Logit Analysis Predicting Corporate Social Performance Awareness.a 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
  (Logits) (Odds ratios) 
Signal Amplitudeb  (H1)  -.05 (.010)*** 0.95 
Signal Dispersion (H3)  .06 (.01)*** 1.06 
Signal Consistency (H5)  .43 (.04)*** 1.54 
    
Corporate Reputation .01 (.01) .01 (.01)* 1.01 
Sizeb  .16 (.02)*** .12 (.02)** 1.13 
Profitability .65 (.11)*** .40 (.12)** 1.48 
Foreign -.06 (.04)+ -.16 (.04)*** 0.86 
Firm Age .002 (.00)*** .001 (.00)* 1.00 
Industryc    
Demographic variablesc    
    
-2 Log Likelihood           34,737.93            34,4363.72 
X2               414.50***              715.71*** 
n  27,166  
  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
a  Standard errors in parentheses.  Model 2 estimates and exponentiated logit value. 
b Logarithmic transformation 
c Industry and demographic control variable results available upon request. 
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Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Analysis Predicting Corporate Social Performance Perception. 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Signal amplitudea, b (H2)  -.02(.01)* -.02(.01)* -.01(.01) 
Signal dispersion (H4)  .03(.01)*** .03(.01)*** -.02 (.00) 
Signal dispersion2 (H4)   .01(.00) -.02(.00) 
Signal consistency (H6)  .01(03) .01(.03) -.00(.03) 
CSP awareness (H7, H8)    .13(.01)*** 
     
Corporate reputation .60(.01)*** .60(.01)*** .60(.01)*** .60(01)*** 
Size1 .02(.01) .00(.02) .00(.02) -.00(.02) 
Profitability .04(.08)*** .04(.08)*** .04(.08)*** .03(.08)*** 
Foreign -.01(.03)* -.02(.03)* -.02(.03)** -.01(.03)* 
Firm age .01(.00) .00(.00) -.00(.00) .00(.00) 
Industryc     
Demographic variablesc     
     
R2 .376 .376 .376 .394 
Adjusted R2 .375 .376 .376 .393 
ΔR2 .376*** .001*** .000 .016*** 
F 1020.73*** 861.36*** 818.31*** 834.69*** 
n 27,166 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
a Logarithmic transformation. 
b  Standardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.   
c Industry and demographic control variable results available upon request. 
CSP = Corporate social performance. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis of Separate Effects Ordered Logit Analysis Predicting Corporate Social Performance Awareness. 
 Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  
 (Logits) (Odds ratios) (Logits) (Odds ratios) (Logits) (Odds ratios) 
Signal amplitudea,b (H1) .03(.00)*** 1.03     
Signal dispersion (H3)   .06(.00)*** 1.06   
Signal consistency (H5)     .38(.03)*** 1.46 
       
Corporate reputation .01(.01) 1.01 .01(.01)+ 1.01 .01(.01)+ 1.01 
Sizea .10(.02)*** 1.11 .07(.02)** 1.07 .09(.02)*** 1.09 
Profitability .41(.11)*** 1.51 .31(.11)** 1.36 .31(.11)** 1.36 
Foreign -.05(.04) 0.95 -.10(.07)** 0.91 -.10(.04)** 0.91 
Firm age .002(.00)*** 1.00 . 001(.00)*** 1.00 . 001(.00)*** 1.00 
Industryc       
Demographic variablesc       
       
-2 Log Likelihood 34,695.38  34,549.78  34,557.31  
X2 457.05***  602.65***  595.12***  
n 27,166 
 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
a Logarithmic transformation. 
b  Standardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.   
c Industry and demographic control variable results available upon request. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis of Separate Effects: Ordinary Least Squares Analysis Predicting Corporate Social Performance 
Perception. 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Signal 
amplitudea,b (H2) 
.02(.00)** .00(.00)      
Signal dispersion 
(H4) 
  .03(.00)*** .03(.00)*** .01(.00)*   
Signal dispersion 
(H4) 
   .01(.00) .00(.00)   
Signal 
Consistency (H6) 
     .01(.02)* .00(.02) 
CSP awareness 
(H7/8) 
 .13(.01)***   .13(.01)***  .13(.01)*** 
        
Corporate 
Reputation 
.60(01)*** .60 (01)*** .60(01)*** .60(01)*** .60(01)*** .60(.01)*** .60(.01)*** 
Sizea .00(.02) -.00(.02) -.00(.02) -.00(.02) .00(.02) .00(.02) .00(.02) 
Profitability .04(.08)*** .03(.08)*** .03(.08)*** .03(.08)*** .03(.08)*** .04(.08)*** .03(.08)*** 
Foreign -.01(.03)* -.01 (.03)* -.01(.03)* -.01(.03)** -.01(.03)* -.01(.03)* -.01(.03)* 
Firm age .01(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Industryc        
Demographic 
variablesc 
       
        
R2 .376 .392 .376 .376 .392 .376 .392 
Adjusted R2 .375 .392 .376 .376 .392 .375 .392 
ΔR2 .00* .017*** .001*** .000 .016*** .00* .017*** 
F 960.79*** 973.30*** 962.30*** 908.99*** 922.44*** 961.14*** 973.30*** 
n 27,166  
 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
a Logarithmic transformation. 
b  Standardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.   
c Industry and demographic control variable results available upon request. 
 
